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Corwin W. Johnson*

Texas Groundwater Law:
A Survey and Some Proposals
INTRODUCTION"
The purpose of this paper is to survey the development of groundwater
law in Texas, identify the major weaknesses in that law as it exists today,
and make some proposals for countering those weaknesses.
THE COURTS
The Supreme Court of Texas first considered the problem of allocating
percolating groundwater among competing well owners in 1904. It held
that damages could not be recovered by an owner of land whose well,
used for his domestic needs, was dried up by a larger well with a more
powerful pump on nearby land owned by a railroad which used the water
for railroad purposes elsewhere than on the land on which the well was
situated.' The court rejected the view that the right to withdraw percolating
water is restricted by a standard of reasonableness. The lower appellate
court had concluded that the railroad's use was unreasonable because it
took place on land other than the tract where the railroad's well was
situated. 2 An off-premise use was deemed unreasonable, the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals indicated, because return flow from such a use would
not reach the aquifer from which it had been withdrawn. Implicit in that
court opinion was the assumption that return flow from on-premise uses
would replenish the aquifer from which it had been withdrawn and that
plaintiff well owner would be benefited thereby. However, the opinions
of both courts were devoid of real knowledge concerning the characteristics of the aquifer. All that was known was that when pumping from
the railroad's well occurred, the home owner's well ceased to function.
This lack of knowledge, and the assumption that sufficient data about
groundwater was unobtainable, supported the Supreme Court of Texas in
its policy of judicial non-intervention.
*Professor of Law, School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin.
'Portions of this article appeared in Discovery: Research and Scholarship at the University of
Texas at Austin, and are reprinted with permission.
1. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904) [hereinafter East].
2. 77 S.W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
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Despite the advancement of knowledge about groundwater since 1904
and the experiences of many other states in managing groundwater, the
Supreme Court of Texas has not departed significantly from its position
in the East case. That position was expressly reaffirmed in City of Corpus
Christi v. City of Pleasanton,' in which the court generalized that
percolating waters are regarded as the property of the owner of the
surface who may, 'in the absence of malice, intercept, impede, and
appropriate such waters while they are upon his premises, and make
whatever use of them he pleases, regardless of the fact that his use
cuts off the flow of such waters to adjoining land, and deprives the
adjoining owner of their use.' 4
In that case, the court declined to interfere with massive pumping of
artesian water from the Carrizo sands for the benefit of a distant city
although this reduced water levels in smaller-capacity wells in the vicinity
and even though possibly as much as 75% of the water pumped failed
to reach its destination due to escape from the natural stream bed used
to transport the water. The court stated that "[albout the only limitations
applied by those jurisdictions retaining the 'English' rule are that the
owner may not maliciously take water for the sole purpose of injuring
his neighbor . . . or wantonly and willfully waste it." 5 It was alleged in
this case that withdrawals were not exceeding the rate of recharge of the
aquifer. Whether the contrary fact, if established, would have been legally
significant was an issue not addressed by the court.
The most recent consideration of groundwater law by the Supreme
Court of Texas was in FriendswoodDevelopment Co. v. Smith-Southwest
Industries, Inc.6 This was a suit for damages by landowners who alleged
that subsidence of their lands was caused by defendants' pumping of
groundwater for industrial uses. Although, as maintained by a dissenting
opinion, this case probably should not have been viewed as a water rights
case, it was so regarded by the court. It was reasoned that since withdrawal
of groundwater would not, in the absence of malice or willful waste,
result in liability for drying up another's well, there also would be no
liability if the same withdrawals caused land subsidence. The court criticized this result, but felt compelled by the logic of the East and Corpus
Christi cases to adopt it. The court declared, however, that future cases
of land subsidence due to withdrawals of groundwater would be governed
by a different rule which would impose liability for pumping that neg3. 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955).
4. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d at 801.
5. Id.
6. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
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ligently causes subsidence. This prospective modification of a facet of
the absolute ownership of groundwater doctrine might stir some hope that
the court is ready to modify other aspects of that doctrine. Further support
for this expectation might be found in the court's generalization that "[wie
agree that some aspects of the English or common law rule as to underground waters are harsh and outmoded . . . "'But these harbingers were
substantially negated by the court's assertions elsewhere in its opinion
that regulation of groundwater withdrawals is more suitably a legislative
than a judicial function-and by the realistic view that this was not really
a water rights case at all.
No Supreme Court of Texas decision has yet addressed legal relationships of groundwater and surface water, but two decisions by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals have done so. 8 Both denied relief for diminution
of the flow of springs due to pumping of groundwater. In one of these
cases, the complainant claimed rights to water in a watercourse the principal source of which was the spring in question. The East case doctrine
of absolute ownership was deemed dispositive of this issue, as well as
of conflicts between well owners. It was recognized that there might be
correlation of rights in ground and surface water if it could be established
that the water underground was in a watercourse rather than percolating.
The burden of persuasion is upon the party alleging the existence of an
underground watercourse. It is not sufficient merely to allege the existence
of an underground watercourse, but the precision with which the location
and characteristics of that alleged watercourse must be cited and proved
has not been made clear by the Texas cases.
Reference should be also be made to a recent decision by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals that the Public Utility Commission of Texas has
authority to restrict pumping of groundwater by a public utility when
such pumping interferes with service by another public utility.9 The rationale offered supporting this view was that the PUC's action constitutes
regulation of utility service, not of groundwater. But the actual impact
of the PUC order upon groundwater rights is significant.
THE LEGISLATURE
In sharp contrast to its establishment long ago of a prior appropriation
system for water in watercourses, replacing in large part the common law
7. Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 28.
8. Pecos County Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. I v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Civ. App. 1948).
After groundwater emerges as a spring, it is treated as surface water. Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d
754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
9. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. City of Sherman, 632 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
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riparian system, the Texas Legislature has left essentially untouched the
common law of groundwater allocation as applied by the Texas courts.
Also, unlike its centralizing in a state agency of regulatory powers over
withdrawals of surface water, the Texas Legislature in 1949 made the
important decision to authorize creation of local districts with discretionary power to regulate withdrawals of groundwater, so long as landowners
are not divested of their "ownership" of groundwater.'" Despite glaring
weaknesses in this district approach to groundwater management, the
Texas Legislature has not seriously considered departing from it.
The shortcomings of the Texas district approach are numerous and
serious." The broad grant of power to Underground Water Conservation
Districts (UWCD's) to "provide for the spacing of water wells" and to
"regulate the production of wells" in order "to minimize as far as practicable the drawdown of the water table or the reduction of artesian
pressure" has never been utilized effectively. 2 Only a few districts, partially covering some aquifers, have been created. Three, all in the High
Plains, are now active. The most active, the High Plains Underground
Water Conservation District No. 1, has regulated spacing of wells and
attempted to prevent excessive application of water in irrigation, but has
not undertaken to curtail production to extend the life of the aquifer."3
Any attempt by this district to restrict withdrawals would be jeopardized
by the exclusion from the district of some of the most heavily pumped
parts of the aquifer. The statute allows the electorate of any county to
exclude that county from a district.
In addition to the enabling legislation for UWCD's, the Texas Legislature has created districts with unique powers over groundwater within
their boundaries. The Edwards Underground Water District, in the San
Antonio region, is broadly authorized to "conserve, protect and increase
the recharge of and prevent the waste and pollution of the underground
water," but regulatory powers needed to implement those goals have not
been conferred upon it.' 4 The district's authority to recharge the aquifer
is hobbled by limitations upon waters available for recharge. 5 The usual
legislative disclaimer of intent to deprive landowners of their rights in
groundwater is repeated in the statute creating the district. The main
functions of this district appear to be data collection and dissemination.
The Texas Legislature in 1975 created the Harris-Galveston Coastal
10. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.001-401 (Vernon 1972).
11. Comment, Ground Water Management: A Proposal for Texas, 61 TEX. L. REV. 289, 29499 (1973).
12. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§52.117 (Vernon 1982).
13. Id.
14. 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 99, as amended 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 306.
15. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (Vernon 1982).
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Subsidence District,' 6 authorized to regulate the withdrawal of groundwater for the purpose of preventing subsidence and resulting flooding.
Challenges to the validity of this district were rejected in Beckendorff v.
Harris-GalvestonCoastal Subsidence District.'7 This case also upheld
the use of fees for permits to withdraw groundwater based upon the
quantity withdrawn, the purpose of these fees being to provide an economic disincentive for massive pumping. Since these fees serve a regulatory function, they are not taxes and therefore not subject to constitutional
requirements for taxes, said the court. The Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District is the only Texas district expressly authorized to use
economic charges to curtail withdrawals of groundwater, and it is limited
to the purpose of preventing land subsidence.
In only a few instances has the Texas Legislature undertaken to address
groundwater problems directly or to authorize a state agency to do so.
An early concern of the legislature was wasteful flowing of artesian
wells. Legislation was enacted in 1913 and 1917 requiring the proper
casing and capping of such wells and providing penal sanctions.' 8 The
legislature has not broadened the scope of this statute, which the Supreme
Court of Texas has narrowly construed concluding that huge loss of
artesian water in transit through a natural watercourse is not forbidden
so long as any of the water is applied to a lawful use.' 9
Recharge of aquifers has received legislative attention, but of a severely
limited nature. The list of purposes for which water in watercourses may
be. appropriated includes recharge of a portion of the Edwards aquifer,
subject to stringent restrictions .20 Since surface water may be appropriated
for "any beneficial use," arguably recharge would have been authorized
to a greater extent if the legislature had remained silent about recharge.
In view of the heavy demands upon surface as well as groundwater,
any proposal for substantial recharge of an aquifer probably would require
importation of water from sources outside Texas. The Texas Legislature
has formally acknowledged that importation of water to the state will be
necessary to meet future needs of Texas, and has requested the governor
to initiate discussions and negotiations with other states concerning "possible importation of their supplies to Texas. 2 Negotiations with other
states have not yet secured a water supply. IfA 1979, the legislature au16. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 284, amended 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 557. The most recent
legislatively created district is the Glasscock County Underground Water Conservation District. The
District's powers are similar to those conferred by the enabling act, supra note 10. The District is
currently being organized. 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 489 (Vernon).
17. 558 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), aff'd., 563 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1978).
18. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.201-207 (Vernon 1982).
19. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 298 (1955).
20. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023 (Vernon 1982).
21. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws H.Comm.Rep. No. 98.
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thorized the Texas Water Development Board to create the Ogallala Water
Import Authority of Texas, whose powers would include the general power
to "acquire and develop any available source of imported water supply
and construct, acquire, develop, operate, and maintain all facilities deemed
necessary or useful with respect to an imported water supply." '22 The
boundaries, of this authority would be generally coextensive with the
Ogallala aquifer in Texas. Imported water is defined so as to embrace
any surface water "not tributary to the area," whether inside or outside
the state. Use of imported water for recharge of the aquifer is authorized,
but not mandated. 23 The evident principal purpose for establishment of
this entity is to satisfy needs for water in the Texas High Plains that the
declining Ogallala will be unable to meet. Conjunctive use of imported
water and Ogallala water for the purpose of extending the Ogallala as a
viable water source is not expressly authorized.
Although the Texas Legislature has shied away from regulating withdrawals of groundwater, it has been very active in recent years in seeking
to protect groundwater from pollution from a variety of activities, including improper drilling of water wells,24 activities associated with the
development of oil, gas, other minerals and geothermal resources, 25 and
26
disposal of wastes in dumps and underground.
Finally, the Texas Legislature has authorized the Texas Water Development Board to acquire physical data concerning the groundwater supply
of the state and to "study and investigate feasible methods to conserve,
27
preserve, improve, and supplement this supply."
Reference should be made to certain statutes that arguably confer substantial regulatory powers over groundwater upon the Texas Department
of Water Resources, but do not clearly do so. No attempt to exercise
these doubtful powers has been made by the department. One of these
statutes requires the owner of a water well to case or plug it if necessary
to prevent the transmission through the well of substances injurious to
vegetation. 28 A provision of this act authorizing its enforcement by the
department states broadly that the "department shall make and enforce
rules and regulations for conserving, protecting, preserving, and distributing underground, subterranean, and percolating water located in this
22. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §64.092(5) (Vernon 1982).
23. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 64.003 (Vernon 1982).
24. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 28.001-004 (Vernon 1982); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
7621e (Vernon Water Aux. Laws Parnph. 1979).
25. See,e.g., 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 171 (Vernon), and TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 131.141 (Vernon 1982).
26. 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 110 (Vernon), and TEX. WATER CODE ANN.§§ 27.001105 (Vernon 1982).
27. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.015 (Vernon 1982).
28. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.001-004 (Vernon 1982).
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state and shall do all other things necessary for these purposes." 29 Taken
literally and out of context, this is a broad mandate, but it will probably
be construed as restricted to the subject matter of the act. Another statute
requires a permit from the Texas Water Commission (a part of the department) for diversion of stream flow into another watershed and prohibits such transfers if they would be to the "prejudice of any person or
property situated within the watershed from which the water is proposed
to be taken or diverted." It is literally applicable to the "underflow" of
streams and thus conceivably is applicable to wells pumping from the
underflow of a stream for transport beyond the watershed. 30 Although this
act was seemingly directed to diversions accomplished by dams, it would
be consistent with the general purpose of the statute to make it applicable
to wells, at least if massive out-of-watershed movement of water is involved.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Although local governments are subject to judicial and legislative constraints, they are relatively significant institutions in groundwater management in Texas. As previously stated, important regulatory powers are
vested in underground water conservation districts. Despite the failure to
use their powers to curtail production, at least one of these districts has
been very active in several programs which may have substantial effects
upon future supplies of groundwater in the areas affected. These programs
include well-spacing regulation, regulation of wasteful applications of
water, attempts to recharge (which reportedly have not been very successful), research, data collection, and education. This district, the High
Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 1, has undertaken
recently a research project to determine the feasibility of secondary recovery of capillary water from the unsaturated portion of the Ogallala
formation.31
Municipalities, as suppliers of huge amounts of both ground and surface
water to a multitude of users, also play a role in groundwater management.
The program of the City of El Paso is of particular importance to relations
between Mexico and the United States concerning shared groundwater
resources. It is reported to be taking several measures to conserve groundwater including: in-well blending of fresh water and saline water, use of
municipal waste water to recharge the aquifer, and a public education
campaign. 32 In addition, the City of El Paso has taken steps to reduce its
29. Id. at § 28.002.
30. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.085 (Vernon 1982).
31. TEXAS DEP'T. OF WATER RESOURCES, TEXAS WATER 1 (Aug. 1981).
32. Interview with Dr. Herbert Grubb, Director of Planning and Development, Texas Department
of Water Resources (Dec. 1, 1981).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 22

demands upon the aquifer by importing water from wells in New Mexico.
This initiative, however, is frustrated, at least for the present, by a New
Mexico statute prohibiting export of groundwater; El Paso is challenging
the validity of this statute in pending litigation.33 The city's water pricing
structure may also significantly affect water usage. Although this structure
has been criticized in the past as encouraging water use,34 the present
scheme is said to discourage excessive consumption.35
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Most administrative aspects of water resources management at the state
level are vested in the Texas Department of Water Resources. As noted
earlier, it does not regulate groundwater withdrawals directly, but engages
in many important functions having to do with management of groundwater. Among these are data collection, research, state-wide planning,
and facilitation of organization of underground water conservation districts.36 Among reports recently published by the department was a study
of the Hueco Bolson in the El Paso area.37
INADEQUACIES OF TEXAS GROUNDWATER LAW AND
PROPOSALS
The shortcomings of law and institutions for managing groundwater
in Texas are serious and glaring. There is a failure to make any substantial
attempt to address the most significant problems of managing groundwater. The major deficiencies will be stated and discussed briefly.
Virtual Absence of Law for Resolving Conflicts Among Pumpers
With minor exceptions detailed heretofore, there is essentially no Texas
law for resolving conflicts among pumpers. Self help, outside the legal
system, typically is the sole remedy for the well owner whose well is
impaired by the pumping of wells by others. The injured well owner may
be able to restore the effectiveness of his well by enlarging it or by
installing a more powerful pump or both. He also may be able to purchase
sufficient land surrounding his well to achieve the same result that well
spacing regulations could provide. These measures require expenditures
of money. Owners of low-capacity wells, such as wells serving the do33. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 730M (D.N.M. filed Sept. 5, 1980).
34. Day, Urban Water Management of an InternationalRiver: The Case of El Paso-Juarez, 15
NAT. RES. J. 453, 464-65 (1975).
35. Telephone interview with John Hickerson, General Manager, Water Utilities Public Service
Board of El Paso (Dec. 14, 1981) [hereinafter Hickerson interview].
36. 1978-79 TEX. DEP'T WATER RESOURCES BIENNIAL REP., at 37-39.
37. Id.
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mestic needs of a family, may be unable to make the expenditures necessary to compete with large-capacity wells of others.
Assuming the existence of sufficient water in the source to supply all
existing and future needs, it is not certain that this is an undesirable
situation. Disruption or termination of existing groundwater uses, especially uses with inferior economic competitive strength, may be deplored,
but a policy of protecting such uses may have the consequence of underutilization of the aquifer. Others subsequently seeking to withdraw from
the same aquifer might be enjoined from doing so, leaving easily obtainable water unused. Newcomers would be forced to reimburse costs
incurred by all existing users due to the withdrawals by the newcomer,
or to furnish an alternate supply of water to existing users. Such costs
might discourage new uses even though the aquifer contains ample water
for all would-be users.
However, to assume the existence of sufficient water in Texas aquifers
today to satisfy all existing and future needs is unrealistic. If the contrary
assumption is made, a policy of protecting existing uses gains strength.
To fail to do so tends to encourage excessive withdrawals. This is due
to the economic fact that the cost of lowering of water levels is not borne
exclusively by the pumper responsible for the drawdown, but rather is
shared by all pumpers from the aquifer.
It appears that a legal doctrine protecting existing uses, assuming that
the aquifer is not under-utilized, would tend both to achieve optimum
utilization of the aquifer and to reach a result that most would deem fair.
The prior appropriation doctrine would protect such uses, but perhaps
should be qualified, as some states have done, by engrafting upon it the
condition that senior uses will be protected only after "reasonable" pumping levels have been reached. Another approach-a permit system without
the trappings of prior appropriation-also could protect existing uses
against increased costs due to drawdown of water levels brought about
by improper spacing of wells or heavy pumping. Most existing pumpers
would receive permits to continue pumping at historic rates. New wells
or increased pumping from existing wells would be permitted only upon
a showing that the proposed withdrawals would not reduce water levels
below "reasonable" levels, or that the applicants would compensate existing well owners for costs that would be caused by the proposed withdrawals. A less complete approach would be statewide application of
well-spacing regulations. This would not meet the problem of allocating
costs of reaching declining water levels due to over-draft of an aquifer.
Lack of Coordination of Groundwater and Surface Water Rights
The present application in Texas of different and uncoordinated legal
doctrines to groundwater and surface water defies the realities of the
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hydrologic cycle. It also impairs the stability of established rights to
surface water by rendering such rights vulnerable to later pumping from
wells drawing from the same source.
The obvious solution of this problem is application of the prior appropriation doctrine to groundwater and integration of surface and groundwater rights. In view of the seniority of surface water uses, this might
be deemed unfair to existing but more recent groundwater uses. It also
might tend to discourage resort to groundwater by those who could seek
either surface water or groundwater. Modifications of the prior appropriation doctrine could meet both of these objections. Existing groundwater uses could be protected by assigning them priorities higher than
the time factor alone would dictate. Holders of surface water rights could
be permitted to satisfy their claims by resorting to wells when it appears
that their needs could be better satisfied by doing so. This would be
merely an application to groundwater of the traditional rule that allows
changes in points of diversion of surface waters, subject to restrictions
to prevent harm to others.
If, because of political opposition or other reasons, the prior appropriation doctrine cannot be applied to groundwater, some degree of coordination may be accomplished by alternative measures. As already
suggested, a permit system for making groundwater withdrawals could
omit the feature of temporal priority and treat all permitted withdrawals
equally in the event of shortage. This could protect surface water rights
by authorizing the permitting agency to deny a permit to drill wells or
make groundwater withdrawals that would injure surface water rights.
This would represent an incomplete coordination. No protection of senior
groundwater uses would be afforded. Also, in the absence of application
of prior appropriation doctrine to groundwater withdrawals, the remedy
of allowing a surface water user to pump from the groundwater source
and retain the same priority as to the well would not be available.
Absence of Any Program To Determine and Assure Optimum Rates of
Depletion of Non-RechargingAquifers
There is no official policy for the state of Texas or any part of it either
(1) to assure that the manner in which withdrawals should be made from
an aquifer which is being mined will result in recovery of the greatest
possible amount of water or (2) to conserve part of the water in such an
aquifer for future needs. The tacit policy is that these are matters properly
within the discretion of underground water districts. As observed earlier,
to date those districts, which now cover only portions of some aquifers
in the state, have taken but a few halting steps toward aquifer management
and failed utterly to set aside any portion of non-recharging aquifers for
future needs. These important and difficult issues should be addressed.
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It seems clear that effective aquifer management requires jurisdiction
over the entire aquifer. This could be done by revamping the underground
water district approach or by replacing it with a state-wide program. The
latter is probably the more likely to succeed. The issue of conservation
for future needs is too important to be left to local determination. Some
states have delegated the responsibility for protecting future needs to a
top water administrative official or agency. This decision involves many
important considerations other than technological proficiency in managing
water resources; the economy of regions and the state are at stake. In
view of the gravity and widespread nature of this issue, the shaping of
at least the main thrust of policy addressing it should be done by some
institution of government with a broader mandate and political base than
the Texas Department of Water Resources. The most appropriate institution for dealing with this problem would seem to be the Texas Legislature.
Assuming that it is determined by the Texas Legislature or by an agency
pursuant to legislative guidelines that all or certain aquifers in Texas
should be pumped at no greater rate than will leave X amount of water
for use in the year Y, some formula for allocating among pumpers the
total amount that may be withdrawn by the year Y must be devised. If
pumping at present rates could continue with assurance that X amount
of water will remain by the year Y, the agency may decide to allow
pumpers to continue at present rates, but to deny permits for new wells
and increased pumping of old wells. If existing pumping must be reduced,
alternative bases for doing so include: (1) pro-rata reduction of historic
withdrawals; (2) pro-rata reduction of water pumped per acre of land
owned by the pumper; (3) termination or reduction of junior uses; and
(4) termination or reduction of less preferred types of uses.
Whatever allocation scheme is adopted, incentives to conserve must
be provided. Such incentives may be regulatory, economic or both. A
pump tax based upon the amount of water withdrawn over a time period
should be seriously considered. Texas now has had some experience with
pump taxes imposed for the purpose of preventing land subsidence. The
revenues produced by pump taxes for non-recharging aquifers probably
should be earmarked for a fund for recharging the aquifer, obtaining
substitute supplies of water for the regions supplied by the aquifer, or
facilitating the economic readjustments of the region when availability
of water for it is substantially reduced.
Absence of Any Programs to ProtectRecharging Aquifers from
Damage Due to Excessive Withdrawals
Overdrafts of recharging aquifers may impair the capacity of aquifers
to function by causing impaction and by sucking saline water into the
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aquifer. The program to deal with land subsidence in the Houston-Galveston region probably will tend to protect the aquifer, but aquifer protection is not the major objective of the program.
There is a need for a statewide program to monitor aquifers to ascertain
when they are endangered and to set in motion procedures to curtail the
rate of withdrawals in such instances. Allocation of curtailments among
pumpers raises essentially the same problem and should be approached
in the same manner as allocation of reduction of permissible withdrawals
from non-recharging aquifers.
IMPACTS OF DEFICIENCIES OF TEXAS GROUNDWATER
LAW UPON THE MEXICO-TEXAS BORDER
As has been observed, the most substantial, albeit inadequate efforts
to address groundwater problems in Texas have been the programs of
local districts. No such district has been created for any aquifer shared
by Mexico and Texas. Pumping on the Texas side is unregulated. This
poses the same problem for Mexican pumpers as for Texas pumpers.
No treaty addresses the problems of aquifers shared by Mexico and
Texas. The waters of the Rio Grande have been allocated by treaty. Due
to the hydrologic unity of ground and surface water, it is possible that
pumping from either side of the river would affect its flow and indirectly
affect treaty allocation of the waters. However that question may be
resolved, it seems that an effective program for aquifers shared by Mexico
and Texas will require not only the coordination of surface and groundwater rights, but also regulation of groundwater withdrawals on both
sides of the border.
CONCLUSIONS
The suggestions made here for reform of Texas groundwater law have
not taken into consideration two obstacles to reform-(1) lack of political
support for such reforms and (2) constitutional protection of property.
The first obstacle is the most formidable. The prevailing view of Texans
today appears to be that, although the state faces serious water problems
that will worsen, no major changes in the law of groundwater or groundwater institutions are needed. No such changes have been proposed in
any bills recently receiving serious consideration in the Texas Legislature.
No Texas public official or agency is currently advocating major change
in the groundwater law or institutions of the state. Private and public
interest groups that take positions on water policy in the state currently
are either advocating no change in Texas groundwater law or institutions
or are half-heartedly advocating changes which they realize have no
chance of being enacted. This widespread lack of interest in reform of
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groundwater law or institutions of Texas may be due to lack of public
understanding of the problem. It also may be partially due to widespread
aversion to governmental intervention in general. The public must be
convinced that governmental intervention is necessary to cope adequately
with the groundwater problems of the state. Until that is done, there is
little point in spelling out the details of a reform program.
The general Texas attitude toward regulation of groundwater appears
to be shared by citizens of El Paso, including officials responsible for the
city's water program. 38 The General Manager of the Utilities Water Public
Service Board of El Paso takes the position that drainage of groundwater
across the border is not likely to occur so long as water levels in wells
on both sides of the border remain about the same, and that continuing
exchange of information at the local level is succeeding in maintaining
the desired equilibrium.3 9
Changes in private property interests in groundwater would encounter
lawsuits alleging that the changes violate provisions of state and United
States constitutions protecting private property. Although such challenges
may be serious, their merits should not be exaggerated. The Supreme
Court of Texas has upheld other alterations of private property. 40 If need
be, the constitution of Texas could be amended. The United States Supreme Court continues to be most reluctant to strike down state legislation
on grounds that such legislation constitutes a deprivation of property
without due process of law or a taking for public use without just compensation."

LEGISLACION DE TEJAS SOBRE AGUAS SUBTERRANEAS: UNA REVISION Y
ALGUNAS PROPUESTAS
El bombeo de aguas subterrineas en Tejas no ha sido reglamentado del todo por
los tribunales, el poder legislativo y los 6rganos administrativos. Los distritos locales
regulan el bombeo parcialmente en unas cuantas Areas. Como proveedores de agua,
los municipios tienen facultades para disponer la conservaci6n. La importaci6n y la
recarga encuentran apoyo en la ley estatal, pero eso no ocurre significativamente.
Existe una gran cantidad de leyes que protegen los acuiferos de la contaminaci6n,
pero, se requieren reformas bisicas para prevenir el bombeo dafiino.
38. Hickerson interview, supra note 35.
39. Id.
40. Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404 (1932).
41. See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a
review of recent decisions on this subject by the United States Supreme Court, see Johnson, Compensationfor Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981).
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Los Tribunales
A falta de legislaci6n, los tribunales de Tejas se han negado a otorgar protecci6n a los duefios de
pozos contra el desgaste provocado por el bombeo en los pozos de otros. Una raz6n esgrimada para
sostener esta posici6n es que las caracterfsticas del agua subterrdnea no son suficientemente conocidas
como para permitir que los tribunales regulen su explotaci6n debidamente. Los tribunales han
sefialado que esto es una funci6n del poder legislativo.
Los tribunales de Tejas de adhieren a esta politica se no-intervenci6n, atn cuando los ofensores
no estn haciendo un uso bendficio del agua. Asimismo se niegan a restringir el bombeo en pozos
que deterioren los derechos de agua en corrientes hidrol6gicamente relacionadas. Ademds, hast 1978
los usarios no estaban sujetos a cubrir dafios y perjuicios causados con el hundimiento de las tierras
de otros, pero la Corte Suprema del Estado, en ese afio, declar6 que en adelante habria que responder
del deterioro causado por negligencia en el bombeo.
La legislatura
La legislatura de Tejas ha promulgado varias disposiciones que reglamentan algunos aspectos del
bombeo de aguas subterrneas. Pero, ha tornado en Io general la posici6n de que la administraci6n
de agua subterrinea es un asunto local que debe ser manejado por los distritos. Ha habido algimn
estimulo para recargar mantos subterrdneos y para importar agua, pero nada se ha hecho al respecto.
Existen bastantes disposiciones para proteger el agua del subsuelo de la contaminaci6n de diversas
fuentes, incluyendo la perforaci6n incorrecta de pozos, las actividades asociadas con petr61eo y gas,
recursos geotdrmicos, minerales diversos y el desecho de desperdicios en tiraderos y bajo tierra.
Gobiernos Locales
En lugares en donde los votantes 1o aprueben, pueden crearse Distritos de Conservaci6n del Agua
Subterrdnea. Tales distritos poseen facultades substanciales, pero s6lo pocos han sido creados y s61o
uno ha estado bastante activo. Ese es el Distrito de Conservaci6n de Agua Subterr.nea No. I de
High Plains, el cual ha regulado el espaciamiento de pozos y el desperdicio de agua, pero no ha
intentado restringir la explotaci6n. No se ha creado ningdin distrito cerca de la frontera M6xicoEstados Unidos.
AdemAs de algunas disposiciones legislativas, el Legislativo ha creado algunos distritos de agua
subterrAnea directamente y con facultades especiales. Uno de 6stos es el Distrito de Sumersi6n,
Costero Harris-Galveston, que estA facultado para regular el retiro de aguas subterrdneas y las
inundaciones resultantes. El distrito aplica derechos de bombeo como un disuasivo contra el bombeo
pesado. Este dispositivo regulatorio ha sido aprobado por los tribunales del Estado y podrian aplicarse
mAs ampliamente.
Los municipios, como proveedores de agua, estdn facultados para disponer la conservaci6n. La
ciudad de El Paso, que comparte agua subterrdnea con Ciudad JuArez, ha emprendido reducir su
necesidad de bombear agua subterrinea mediante la mezcla dentro del pozo de aguas frescas y
salinas, el uso de agua de desecho municipal para recargar el manto subterraneo, la importaci6n de
agua subterrfnea de Nuevo Mxico, y la educaci6n ptiblica. Nuevo Mdxico esti oponidndose judicialmente al intento de El Paos de importar agua subterrinea de ese Estado.
Reformas necesarias
Se requieren varias reformas a las leyes de aguas subterrfineas de Tejas, incluyendo: 1) algdin
m~todo de resolver conflictos entre bombeadores; 2) algtln mdtodo de coordinar los derechos de
aguas de superficie y subternineas; 3) un programa para determinar y asegurar tasas 6ptimas de
agotamiento de mantos recargables de dafios causados por desgaste excesivo.
El obsticulo mls grande al logro de estas reformas es la opini6n pfiblica, la cual se opone a una
regulaci6n estricta, especialmente por parte de los gobiemos estatal o federal. Las restricciones
legales no parecen ser efectivas.
La administraci6n efectiva de los manto subterrneos compartidos por Mdxico y los Estados
Unidos requerirdn de algdn tipo de programa que abarque todo el manto. Esto se podrfa lograr
mediante un acuerdo intemacional, adn cuando las leyes de Tejas no sean reformadas.

